REASONS

FOR THE

NEUTRALITY

OF

GREAT-BRITAIN,

DEDUCED

From her EXPLOITS for the House of AUSTRIA.

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REASONS

FOR THE

NEUTRALITY

OF

GREAT-BRITAIN,

DEDUCED

From her Exploits for the Houſe of Austria.

THAT *England*, in her *Treaties of Peace*, had been conſtantly over-reach'd by Thoſe, with whom ſhe tranſacted them, was the antient Obſervation of *Philip de Commines*, and others. But weary with treading always in the *ſame* Paths of Glory, ſhe hath ſince changed her Conduct. From being the *Dupe of Nations* in her *pacifick*, ſhe at length became ſo in her *martial*, Reſolutions; that the *Olive*, and the *Lawrel*, might ſucceſſively renown her. Grown enamoured of the *latter*, ſhe has at different Times been deck'd with it by dif-

ferent Princes, that have alternately excited her to *Heroiſm*; and has fought herſelf into *Fame*, and *Poverty*, for the *Advantage* of thoſe who did, and the *Diverſion* of thoſe who did not, employ her. She *began* her *Chivalry* with being the *Bubble* of *France*, and ſeems reſolved to *end* it with being the *Tool* of *Germany*. The Inſtances to be given of the *latter* are many, and of recent Date; but for the *former*, we muſt aſcend to the *Æra* of King *Charles*'s *ſecond* War with *Holland*. For as to the Cauſes of the *firſt*, it was not true that the *Inſanative* Potion was of *French* Preſcription. It muſt be aſſerted upon an Authority not to be impeach'd by Lord *Arlington*'s Teſtimony, that this Story was the Fiction of *l'Iſola* and *Eſtevan de Gamarra*, at *London* and the *Hague*, to promote the Views of their reſpective Principals. But the Subſerviency of that King's Meaſures to the Deſigns of *France* muſt be acknowledged in the *ſecond* Dutch War, proſecuted in Concert almoſt to the Deletion of that State, and, conſequent thereupon, the Extinction of the Liberties of *Europe*. To conceal the Tendency of this pernicious Alliance, it was neceſſary for *France* to deſire it upon *Pretences*, that ſhe knew would paſs for *Realities* with her *wiſe* Ally. The decent Motives of enabling King *Charles* to reign with *Eaſe*, that is, to reign without a *Parliament*, and ſubjugate his People to *Popery* and *Arbitrary Power*, which would be very difficult to accompliſh without deſtroying a *Republick*, that might aſſiſt his Subjects in their Oppoſition to ſuch *ſalutary* Schemes, was the Bait that diſguiſed the Hook. The *eaſy* King was caught; and did not know

that

that he had been fighting the Battles of *Univerſal Monarchy*, till many Years afterwards, when *Lewis the* 14*th* made him the modeſt Propoſal of never keeping on Foot a larger military Force than 8000 Men, his Indignation at which ſhew'd plainly he had been made the *Tool* of *French* Ambition. Nor is there any thing in the Abbot *Primi*'s ſecret Hiſtory, but what may very well conſiſt with this.

But King *William*'s War muſt be excluded from the Inſtances of *England*'s martial *Inſanity*. And ſo muſt the *Beginning* of *Queen Anne*'s, founded upon the ſame general Motives with the *former*, and entered into upon the Alliance which King *William* had concluded. One of the leading Conſiderations to it was *France*'s having accepted *Portocarrero*'s teſtamentary Diſpoſition of the *King of Spain*'s Dominions, which threatned *Europe* with the Union of thoſe two potent Monarchies. To extend ſo melancholy a Proſpect, ſhe had procured the Admiſſion of her Troops into the ſtrong Places of the *Spaniſh Netherlands* by the *Elector of Bavaria*. It was neceſſary therefore for the *Grand Alliance* to ſtipulate, as it did, with regard to the *Emperor*, that a Satisfaction ſhould be procured him for his Pretenſions on the *Spaniſh* Monarchy. Becauſe, from his being put in Poſſeſſion of this Satisfaction, would conſequentially ariſe the Security of *England* in a more equal *Balance of Power*. It was no leſs the Intereſt of *England* to procure a good Barrier for her Barrier, *Holland*. The Recognition of the *Queen*'s Title regarded her in particular, and the ſetling *Commerce* upon an advantageous Footing, both *her* and *Holland*. So

far was juſt and neceſſary, and this might have been obtained after the Victories of *Ramillies*, and *Turin*, as well as the Intereſts of the other Allies adjuſted. But the *Fit* was now returned, and *England* in her *Delirium* called out, that there could be no Satisfaction to the *Emperor* for his Pretenſions on the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, without procuring him the *Whole*. The *Imperial* Court had even Dexterity enough to *dupe* her into a Stipulation for this Purpoſe in the Treaty with *Portugal*. And from this Time ſhe took upon herſelf (*Holland* contributing little to it) the Conqueſt of *Spain* for the *Houſe of Auſtria*. This was aſſuming the *Heroine* with a Witneſs. But the Miniſter of that Time had read the Adventures of *Don Quixotte*, and thought it would be ignoble for the Arms of *England* not to vindicate, from *French* Subjection, *La Mancha* that bore him.

In Proſecution of this, the Blood and Treaſure of *Great Britain* was ſo profuſely waſted, that Poſterity would hardly believe it, if they did not feel the Effects of it. She alone maintained *One hundred and ſixty Thouſand Land Forces*, including the one half of *eight Thouſand Pruſſians* (Part of the Troops which compoſed the Army in *Flanders*) for which ſhe provided only Bread and Forage; and, among the reſt of her *Gaieties*, voluntarily took upon herſelf the Pay of the *Emperor*'s third Part of *Thirteen thouſand* Men, which He, and the two *maritime Powers*, were obliged by Treaty to furniſh *Portugal* with, in *equal* Proportions. Beſides this, *forty thouſand Seamen*, including the *Marines*, or rather *forty three thouſand*, if we may rely upon a Pamphlet aſcribed at that Time to

Mr.

Mr. *Walpole*; the Expence of this latter Article alone, without the *Ordinary of the Navy*, and other *Contingencies*, amounting annually to *two Million, two hundred, and thirty ſix thouſand* Pounds; that is, to a Sum that would have paid about a *hundred and ten thouſand* Land Forces more, as any one may ſee, that will be at the Trouble of caſting his Eyes upon the *late*, made upon the footing of *former* Treaties, with the *Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel*, and *others* of the ſame Kind, and the *annual* Demands on *Parliament*, including the Intereſt of Debts already contracted, were increaſed to above *eight millions*, as the *Houſe of Commons* repreſented to the *Queen* in the Year 1711. And to what Purpoſe this the Six laſt Years of the War? To compel *France* to acquieſce in the Ceſſion of the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy to the Houſe of *Auſtria*; that is, to overturn the *Balance of Europe* in Favour of *that* Houſe, as much as it was in Danger of being overturned before by the Houſe of *Bourbon*.

There never was but one plauſible Excuſe offered for this *frantick* Meaſure; and that was, that the Emperor *Joſeph* being yet alive, and a reaſonable Expectation of *male* Iſſue from him, the *Imperial* and *Catholick* Titles would be ſevered by conferring the latter on his Brother *Charles*, the preſent *Emperor*. And if my Lord *Godolphin*'s Friends had changed their Opinion upon that Contingency's happening *otherwiſe*, it would have been ſome Vindication of their *precedent* Meaſures. But it's evident they did not. *Addreſſes*, *Proteſts*, Count *Bothmar*'s *Memoral*, all concurred in aſſerting, that no Peace could be ſafe, or honourable,

nourable, without the entire Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, the not procuring which ought to be looked upon as ſome Compenſation for the *unfortunate* Parts of the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

While *England* was exerting herſelf in this extraordinary Manner, from the Year 1706, ſolely for the Intereſt of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, what did that Houſe do for *itſelf?* It may be collected from hence. When Prince *Eugene* came over hither in 1711, to ſollicit the Continuance of the War. He offered to engage on the *Emperor*'s Part for an *extraordinary* Augmentation of his Forces, which ſhould make the *Total* Amount of them for the *future* 108,000 Men; of which 24,000 were to ſerve in *Flanders*, 20,000 in *Spain*, and 18,000 on the *Rhine*. So that as an Inſtance of that Court's *extraordinary* Zeal, and of Efforts they had not made *before*, they were to bring 62,000 Men into the Field, for the *common* Intereſts of the *Confederacy*.

It may be replied, perhaps, that the *Emperor* could do no *more*, and that it's ungenerous to impute that to him as a Crime, which was real *Inability*. Let it be ſo. But then ſome little Complaiſance might have been expected by *England*, ſome few Returns of *Imperial* Gratitude; in the fair Liſt of which we find recorded, firſt, the ineffectual Mediation of *England* and *Holland* in Favour of the perſecuted *Hungarians*, by which a great Body of the *Imperial* Troops was detained on the Side of *Hungary*, and *Tranſylvania*. that the Burden of the War with *France* might fall heavier on the *Maritime Powers*; then, fifty capital Ships

Ships of *France* preſerved from Ruin, by detaching to the *Neapolitan* Expedition, Part of the Troops that were to have formed the Siege of *Toulon*, contrary to the reiterated Importunities of thoſe, to whom ſo irreparable a Blow to the *French* naval Power would have been ſignally beneficial; after that, the rejected Award of the *ſame Powers* in Favour of the *Duke of Savoy*, on Occaſion of the *Montferrat* Differences, contrary to all natural Equity, becauſe the *Court of Vienna* had accepted their Arbitration; ſignified too in a Declaration of ſuch indecent *Aſperity*, that one would have thought they had been cenſuring the Conduct of *tributary* Nations.

But unaffected with theſe awakening Incidents, *England* relax'd nothing of her Friendſhip for the *always-auguſt* Houſe. The wild Scheme of conquering *Spain* was proſecuted with Ardour. For this, her Armies were annually reinforced, and Augmentations ſucceeded to Augmentations. But *Count Sinzendorff*'s Miſt was at length happily diſſipated, and *Du-Mont* made EUROPE SIGH in vain, for a *Cataſtrophe* ſo fatal to the towering Projects of his Maſter. For *England* having recovered her *Eye-Sight*, ſaw clearly now, that a Union of the *whole Spaniſh Monarchy* with the *Imperial* Dignity, and the *Hereditary Countries*, would weigh down the *Auſtrian* Scale too much, and enable to reſume its Schemes of *Univerſal Monarchy* a Houſe that had *once* aſpired to it. And how fortunately, in this Reſpect ſhe judged for *Europe* in general, and her *own* Intereſt in particular, wants, I think, no Proofs ſince the firſt Treaty of *Vienna*.

Upon

Upon the *late King*'s Acceſſion to the Crown, many looked upon it as an additional happy Circumſtance attending it, that his Territories in *Germany*, able to ſend into the Field at leaſt 20,000 Men, would greatly alleviate the Expence of *England*, in any future *Land War*. But *many* too judged *differently*, and ſaid, *Time* would evince this to be no better Reaſoning, than it would be for a Surgeon to ſay, *Pray, Sir, do me the Favour to let me break your Legs, becauſe I know how to ſet them again.* Theſe laſt affirmed, that it was impoſſible for the LYON and the HORSE to be united in a perpetual Alliance, without eminent Diſadvantages to the *former*, who, from his ſuperior Strength would be obliged always to *protect*, without ever being *protected by*, the *latter*. They maintained, that it was an obvious Truth, not diſcernable at this or that time for *invidious* Purpoſes, but at all times manifeſt, that *Great Britain*, from the Moment ſhe became aſſociated in Subjection with *moderate* Territories on the *Continent*, was diſpoſſeſſed of her natural *watry* Frontier, and acquired in the Room of it an unnatural *Land* one, ſubject to the Menaces, and expoſed to the Invaſions of thoſe, who, by their remote Situation *before*, could no ways affect her. But who now, theſe *audacious* Reaſoners ſay, compenſating her *Fleets* with their *Armies*, and threatning to retaliate her Operations at *Sea* by theirs at *Land*, indirectly preſcribe to her Councils, and dictate to her Kings. They endeavour to confirm themſelves and others in this Opinion, by arguing, that this may be attempted *again*, becauſe it has been attempted *already*, for which they

cite

cite the Authority of the *Miniſter*, who negotiated at *Paris* the Treaty ſigned at *Hanover*. They allow indeed to the *opportune* Repreſentations of our *Allies*, that it was in this Inſtance *unſucceſsfully* endeavoured, but this, they pretend, is no Proof that it never did ſucceed *before*, and never will *again*. The Teſtimony hinted at is that of the *Gentleman's* juſt mentioned, who, when he informed the *Houſe of Commons* of his late *Majeſty's* communicating to the Contracting Powers in the firſt Treaty of *Vienna* his Reſolutions to oppoſe it, This, ſays he, was received with Coldneſs at *Madrid*, and with Haughtineſs at *Vienna*, inſomuch that the *latter* did not ſtick to inſinuate, that ſuch Meaſures might have *Conſequences on his Majeſty's Dominions in* Germany.

But here a neceſſary *Diſtinction* ought to be recollected, which is, that it's one Thing to contract *Alliances*, for the ſake of *General Guarantees*, upon Motives deducible originally from thoſe Territories *only*, and another to protect them from the Conſequences of a Quarrel entirely *Engliſh*. So that unprejudiced Perſons may be allowed to wonder that the *Miniſtry* ſhould, upon all *publick* Occaſions, have diſavowed the *real* Inducements of taking into Pay the 12000 *Heſſians*. It could not be ſaid, that *Holland*, in its preſent Circumſtances, was a Country to be over-run, before the 12000 ſtipulated Auxiliaries could be tranſported to its Aſſiſtance. With as little Reaſon could it be alledged, that the raiſing the ſame Number at Home would be a greater *National* Expence than the hiring *Foreigners*. For in

the *latter* Caſe, it was evidently ſo much Money ſunk to the Kingdom, but if the *former* Method had taken Place, tho' a greater *immediate* Diſburſement would have been requiſite, yet the People would ſtill have retained it; the Money would only have been *removed* from one Pocket to another, and the Treaſures of the Nation, *as a Nation*, not diminiſhed. But to admit foreign Troops into a *State* of the *Empire* to prevent only a *meditated* Attack, would have been an Illegality according to the *Germanick* Conſtitutions; and to ſend them after an Attack *begun*, would have been too late to repel it. There was no Reaſon therefore to conceal the Motives of having Recourſe to the Troops of a neighbouring Prince of the *ſame* Country. 'Twould be hard that the not defending the Territories of a *Son-in-Law* ſhould be the Ignominy of *one* Reign, and the not defending, with *Conſent of Parliament*, the Dominions of the *Prince* himſelf, threatned with Hoſtilities, in Reſentment of *Britiſh* Meaſures, conſtitute the Glory of *another*.

But Sweetneſs of *Revenge* might induce Men to that, from which cool unperverted Reaſon would have diſſuaded them, and the Oppoſition to the Meaſures, for defending the *foreign Territories* might be thought a juſt Requital for that *Complaiſance*, which the *Emperor* had a little before negotiated us into by *their* Mediation; in the Attack of the *Spaniſh* Fleet on the Coaſt of *Sicily*, which was plainly a Relapſe into *Heroiſm*, in the Opinion, I think, even of *thoſe*, who have ſucceeded in the Adminiſtration. They who accounted for this Step from the Stipulations of the Treaty

of

of *London*, went indeed one Link higher in the Chain of Cauſes and Conſequences, but without aſcending to the *original* and *efficient* Cauſe. To this one *fatal* Inſtance of *Knight Errantry* for the *Imperial* Intereſts, recommended to us from *Lower Saxony*, may be aſcribed the *long-laid-up* Animoſity of *Spain*, which, when it diſplayed itſelf, neceſſarily occaſioned ſuitable Returns on *our* Part, and *theſe* again produced thoſe *Detentions*, *Captures*, and *Plunderings*, with all the long Train of *Commercial* Woes. It muſt be allowed however, in Excuſe for the not reſenting them, that theſe predatory Inſults, on the Part of *Spain*, were for the *moſt* Part by *Connivance* only, and not avowed *regal* Acts; but ſo *viſibly* Connivances, that nothing but the languid State of our *Revenues*, exhauſted by Wars for the Conveniency of *two* Emperors, would have deterred us from making Repriſals for. And its too diſtinguiſhing a Circumſtance of the *preſent* Emperor's Gratitude ever to be forgot, that He himſelf was the *faſt* Ally of *Spain* in the Proſecution of a Reſentment derived primarily from our too friendly Offices for him in the Fight of *Syracuſe*, and prohibited, by exceſſive Duties, the Importation of our Manufactures into that very *Iſland*, which he had juſt before received from *Engliſh* Generoſity.

And this brings me to the preſent War between the *Emperor* and the *Allies*, when the Councils of all *Europe* are employed in diſcuſſing how the Intereſts of their reſpective *Sovereigns* may be affected by the Events that may ariſe in it; in relation to which I ſhall premiſe two general Obſervations.

1ſt, That National Power is of a *comparative* Nature, to be deduced only from the *inferior* Degrees of Power in the neighbouring *States*; and the more theſe are depreſſed with *equal* War, the greater will be the Acceſſion of Influence produced to that Nation that does not interfere, and her Aſcendency will increaſe in the ſame Proportion that theirs diminiſhes.

2dly, That this Conſideration ought to weigh more with *England* now, than at any Time ſince the laſt of *Queen Mary* to the Succeſſion of the *late King*, becauſe, during that Period of 155 Years, her Kings had no Poſſeſſions on the *Continent* of *Europe*, one impregnable Fortreſs, and that lately acquired, only excepted. And not to wiſh for a Diminution, by Methods that will at the ſame Time exhauſt the other great *Rival Power*, of the *Emperor*'s Strength, who *once* did, who, from their Vicinity to his Territories, may *again*, threaten to attack the Dominions of our *Sovereign*, would be the ſame Abſurdity for *England*, as not to have wiſhed for a Diminution of the *French King*'s Power, when her ancient Princes where the Sovereigns of *Normandy*.

And now with regard to the preſent War, and the general Apprehenſion of a returning Flexibility in our Councils to the *Imperial* Sollicitations, I ſhall not enter into a dry Diſquiſition of the *Poliſh* Treaties, which the Miniſters of the *Emperor*, and *France*, have done for me; but this we may be ſure of, that *his Majeſty*, before he takes up Arms, will, with his uſual Piety, weigh the Juſtice of the Cauſe;

Cauſe; and if it ſhall appear to him, that the *Emperor* has, by *Himſelf*, or by his *Influences*, violated the Rights of a free Republick, in the *Election* of their King, He will then be of Opinion, that the *Court of Vienna*, before they had taken ſo unwarrantable a Step, ought to have been ſure of their *own* Abilities to ſtand to the *Conſequences* of it, without expecting that every haughty Meaſure of *theirs* ſhould be adopted by their *Allies*; and he will reply to the Importunities of the *Imperial* Miniſter, as *Queen Elizabeth* once did to the Duke of *Aquileia*, *Every one muſt look to their own Houſe, and I will look to mine.* That the *Emperor* has drawn this War upon himſelf is plainly the Opinion of the wiſeſt Heads in *Holland*, and we have no Reaſon to doubt but thoſe who *ought* to have the wiſeſt Heads in *England*, will think ſo too.

It will be allowed me, that whether *Staniſlaus*, or *Auguſtus*, be *King* of *Poland*, conſidered *ſimply*, and in its *immediate* Conſequences, no more regards *England*, than whether *Schach Thamas*, or *Kouli Kan*, be *Sophy* of *Perſia*. And I in *my* turn ſhall allow, that, from its *remote* Conſequences, *other* Reaſonings may ariſe, and thus much may be ſaid. " To pre-
" ſerve the *Indiviſibility* of the *Hereditary*
" Countries, eſtabliſhed by the *Pragmatick*
" *Sanction*, concerns all *Europe*. The Execu-
" tion of this will be oppoſed by *France*, and
" to ſucceed in that Oppoſition, nothing would
" be more convenient for her, than to have
" upon the Throne of *Poland* a Prince enga-
" ged by the Ties both of *Affinity* and *Grati-*
" *tude* to promote her Views; eſpecially ſince
" ſhe

" ſhe might then find Means to unite with *Po-*
" *land* ſome of the neighbouring *Northern*
" Crowns in the Proſecution of her Meaſures.
" And *England* would then have Reaſon to
" apprehend her Inſecurity, from the Proſpect
" of an *unrivalled* Power in the Houſe of *Bour-*
" *bon.*" But will it be juſtifiable to common Senſe, for *England* to run into a *certain* War to avoid an *uncertain* one? To take up Arms upon ſuch *diſtant* Appearances, the *Apprehenſion of an Apprehenſion* of Danger, which a thouſand intervening Accidents may avert? Can we be *ſure* that King *Staniſlaus* will out-live the *Emperor*, who is a *younger* Man? Are we certain that the Courts of *Sweden* or *Denmark* would act in Concert with *Poland*, to ſupport the Deſigns of *France*, without the leaſt Regard in their Councils, to their formidable Neighbour *Ruſſia?* Or will *England*, by impoveriſhng herſelf in an *unneceſſary* War, be enabled to exert herſelf effectually in a *neceſſary* one?

But it may be ſaid, that, from *whatever* Cauſes it ariſes, *England* is concerned to reſcue the Houſe of *Auſtria* from too great an *Inferiority* with regard to *France*. This might be admitted, if that Houſe did not contribute to its own Depreſſion, by furniſhing, or continuing, the Cauſe, when in her Power to *remove* it. But ſuppoſe it were admitted without any Qualification, how would it be applicable at preſent? The *French*, it's true, have taken *Fort Kehl*, and opened to themſelves a Paſſage into *Germany*; but their *next* Step may be attended with greater Difficulties. They may loſe a Battle in attempting *Philipsburgh*. *Friburgh*

and

and *Briſack* may be *taken* and *retaken* ſucceſſively, and a *ſingle* Town prove the Conteſt of a *whole* Campaign. If we take a View of the Forces of the *Emperor* and *Empire*, We ſhall find they have on Foot 450,000 Men. It ſhall be allowed, that the greateſt Part of thoſe belonging to the *Emperor* will be diverted from the Side of the *Rhine* to the *Hereditary* Countries. But if it *ſhould* be ſo, how will this endanger *Germany?* The Princes of the *Empire* may perhaps be diſabled, by Want of *Money*, from ſending the *Whole* of their Troops from their reſpective Homes, and yet be very able, out of ſuch numerous Bodies, to march as *many* as may be ſufficient to oppoſe one *ſingle* Army of *France*; and not only to march them, but to furniſh them with Artillery towards the End of the Year, and with Powder and Ball to charge them the Year afterwards. But ſuppoſe the *Circles* ſhould be as drowſy *this*, as they have been in *preceding* Wars, muſt the *Germanick* Heavineſs be compenſated by *Engliſh* Alacrity? They don't want the *Ability*, why ſhould they want the *Inclination*, to defend themſelves? Will the *German* Swords loſe their Edges, unleſs *touched* with *Engliſh* Gold? Muſt the Princes of the *Empire* be *bribed* into a Concern for their own *Principalities*, and *Germany* paid by *England* for defending *Germany?*

On the Side of *Italy* again, the *French* have made an Irruption into the *Milaneze*, and are likely to ſubdue it. But will the Poſſeſſion, perhaps but for one *ſingle* Winter, of a Country in Length 80 Miles, and in Breadth 60, entirely overthrow the *Equilibrium* between

Princes

Princes of ſuch extended Dominions? From the *Veteran* Troops the *Emperor* has on Foot *already*, and from the *new* Levies he is making, there is no Reaſon to apprehend, but that, *next* Campaign, Things will be in a quite *different* Poſture there, than they are at preſent. Have the *French* and *Spaniards* always been victorious in *Italy*? Were they never expelled the *Milaneze* by one ſingle Battle? The Campaign of 1706 will reply for me. But ſuppoſe they ſhould not be *immediately* diſlodged by one deciſive Stroke, and that *Lombardy*, and *Naples* too, ſhould for many Years be the Seat of *War*, how will this affect *England*? Muſt ſhe *neceſſarily* interpoſe, to forbid the contending Powers enervating each other with *ſucceſſive* Action, and *alternate* Defeats; The *Germans* may be knocked on the Head for ten Campaigns, without exciting any other Regards in us than thoſe of common Humanity. The *French* too may be gathered to the Sepulchre of their *Fathers*, and ſleep quietly in the ancient *Church-yard* (as *Mezeray* calls it) of that Nation, *Italy*, without *England*'s being at the Expence of their Funeral.

But it may be objected, that we are obliged by *Treaty* to aſſiſt the *Emperor*, and *federal* Engagements muſt be complied with. The Tenour of thoſe *Treaties* runs, that *England* ſhall furniſh the *Emperor*, in Caſe of an *Attack*, with 4000 Horſe, and 8000 Foot, and if that ſhould not be ſufficient to repel the Aggreſſion, then to declare *War*. But to the Term *Aggreſſion*, or *Attack*, by the equitable Conſtruction of Treaties, the Word *unjuſt* muſt be prefixed. Beſides, were it as manifeſt

feſt that *France* is the Aggreſſor, as the *Dutch* in their late Declaration to Count *Sinzendorff* aſſert it's clear the *Emperor* is, is there not a reaſonable Space of Time, left undetermined by *Treaty*, to try the Efficacy of thoſe Auxiliaries for the Purpoſe deſigned, before we embark as *Principals* in the War? And to determine whether that Space ſhall be *ſhorter* or *longer*, may as well depend upon *ourſelves*, as upon the *Emperor*. The Introduction of *Don Carolos*, *&c.* was by the Treaty of *Seville* to be *des a preſent*, or *immediately* effectuated, and yet *Spain* found by the Sequel, that the *Engliſh* Interpretation of *immediately* was *two Years*. When is the *ſupreme* Law, the *tranſcendental* Maxim of good Policy, *Salus Populi*, to operate, if it does not now? Muſt *England* never deviate from the *Letter* of Her Treaties, to avoid a War *for* the *Emperor*, tho' She has very lately done ſo, to avoid it *with* Him. By the 4th Article of the Treaty of *Hanover*, the Contracting Parties bound themſelves not to enter into *any* Negotiations, relative to the Engagements of that Treaty, with the *adverſe* Powers, but in *Concert*. Notwithſtanding which, *England* not only *entred* into, but *perfected*, the ſecond Treaty of *Vienna*, without the Participation of the Court of *France*.

I have often wondered, that in Relation to *mutual general Guarantees* with the *Emperor*, it has never been obſerved, that to make this an *equitable* Stipulation for *England*, there ought not only to be an *Equality of Obligation*, but an *Ability* in *each* of the *Contracting* Parties to comply with it, and ſomething too like an *Equality of Danger* common to *Both*, that the

Operation of this *Guaranty* may not always be demanded on *one* ſide, and never on the *other*.

And firſt, *for the Equality of Obligation*. When by Treaty it's ſtipulated between the *Emperor* and *England*, to act in favour of each other with *all* their Forces, or, in other Words, to make it a *common Cauſe*, if *amicable* Methods of redreſſing the Injury ſhould prove ineffectual, what does this engage *England* to? To act both by *Sea* and *Land*. And what the *Emperor*? To act by *Land* only; becauſe it can't oblige him to that which He is under a *natural* Impoſſibility of complying with. Nor does the Diſparity ariſe from the being obliged to act on *two* Elements, againſt the acting on *one* only; becauſe the Efforts on the *One* by *this* Party might be equal to Thoſe on *both* by *That*. But from hence reſults the Inequality, that *Great Britain* obliges herſelf to a Method of War, that Nature by her *Situation* has pointed out to be irrational, and the *Experience* of paſt Ages prov'd to be pernicious, and deſtructive; while the *Emperor* obliges himſelf to no *other* Species of Hoſtilities than that ſuited to the Circumſtance of an Empire on the *Continent*. To conſtitute therefore an *Equality of Obligation*, the *Emperor* ſhould be entitled to ask nothing of Us, except a *Fleet*, becauſe we can demand nothing of Him, except an *Army*, and *England* is as much under a *moral* Impoſſibility of proſecuting a War on the *one* Element, as He is under a *natural* Impoſſibility of making Efforts on the *other*.

2*dly*, There ought to be in *each* of the contracting Parties an *Ability to comply with their Stipulations*. But ſuppoſe *England* ſhould be attacked

attacked the *only* Way by which ſhe can be attacked, that is, through her *watry* Rampart, and *floating* Baſtions, what Succours can the *Emperor* contribute in this Caſe? Can his Fleets on the *Danube* be ſent to our Aſſiſtance? Or are we to expect it from *Oſtend* and *Fiume*? Or will his Armies wade through the Sea to the *Britiſh* Shores? But it may be ſaid, that our *commerical* Privileges may be invaded, and that He who has ſhew'd the ſtrongeſt Diſpoſition of *any* Power in *Europe* to invade them, may become the Aſſertor of our violated Rights, and make an Impreſſion on the Aggreſſor with his *Land Forces*. But even this will not be true with regard to *all* the Powers of *Europe*; *Ruſſia*, for Inſtance, *Spain* and *Portugal*.

3*dly*, There ought to be an *equal Probability of Danger to both Parties* to make the Terms of a *mutual Guaranty* equitable. But is a Country, diſſociated by Nature from the whole World, under the ſame Circumſtances of *precarious* Tranquillity, with a Monarch, the Proximity of whoſe Territories, in one Part or another, to almoſt *every* State in *Europe*, furniſhes the Suggeſtions of *Ambition*, *Jealouſy*, and *Reſentment*, with the Opportunities of diſcloſing their Malignity? It would be waſting of Words to expatiate on this. Experience ſhall prove it for me. Inſtances have been ſhew'd (may *another* not too ſoon be ſhew'd) of *England*'s having been obliged to enter into, or continue, a War, for Intereſts *ſolely Imperial*; let one *ſingle* Inſtance be produced of the *Emperor*'s having been obliged to take up Arms for Conſiderations *ſolely Engliſh*.

But to return to the preſent Situation of Affairs. Is not the Hand of *Providence*, that has been ſo often extended in our Favour, plainly viſible in it? Have our Farmers been *overſtock'd* by the *unuſual* Plenty of *four* ſucceſſive Summers? What could *indulgent* Heaven do more for them, than to curſe foreign Lands with *War*, and *Devaſtation*, that the diminiſhed Produce of the *One* might compel a Recourſe to the augmented Stores of the *other*. To ſignalize yet more this *Providential* Diſpenſation, that fruitful Country, thoſe very *Poliſh* Fields, that uſed to repleniſh the *Southern* Magazines, are waſted now by the licentious Soldier, that the Penury of *Spaniſh* and *Italian* Harveſts may be repaired alone from the overflowing Granaries of *England*. Has the *French* Application to *Planting* and *Manufacturing* interfered with *Ours*? The Fruits of that Induſtry will now be made precarious to them by *Imperial* Privateers, while the *Britiſh* Commerce is proſecuted in full Security. Have we any Demands unſatisfied, any Differences unadjuſted, with the *Powers* ſolliciting us to *Peace* or *War*? The *Hopes* and *Fears* of thoſe *Powers* may in return be applied to by *Miniſterial* Dexterity, to obtain the *one*, and terminate the *other*. Have *ſome* of our Neighbours lately obliged us with Proofs of an Inclination to interrupt our Tranquillity? The pecuniary Diſtreſſes of thoſe Neighbours, that muſt ariſe *hereafter* from their taxing and borrowing *now*, will deter them, for a long Series of Years, from reſuming ſuch unfriendly Views. 'Tis impoſſible for a penetrating Miniſter not to ſee with Pleaſure the *Sileſian*

Mines mortgaging in *Holland* or *here*, and *France* in due Time ſadling her Revenues with *Anticipations*, from which another *Miſſiſippi* Scheme may not relieve them. But all this muſt be qualified with *one* Proviſo, that there is not in the preſent War ſuch a rapid Courſe of Victory on *either* Side (which no one living can aſſert there will be) as to endanger the great *Equilibrium*.

I purpoſely decline applying to *particular* Facts theſe *general* Hints, that every One's own Obſervation may do it for me, and from thence be lead to conſider, if the preſent Conjuncture, far from a *diſaſtrous*, is not the moſt *ſalutary*, One, that could happen for *England*. There can be but one *reaſonable* Objection to it, which ſhall be allowed its Weight. And that is, that the Conſequences of the Poſſeſſion, by the *French* and *Spaniards*, of thoſe Countries, to which at preſent they ſeem to point their Conqueſts, may affect the Security of our *Mediterranean* Commerce. But not to repeat what has been ſaid before of the Probability of that Poſſeſſion's being only *temporary*, it ought to be remembered that there is only *one* of thoſe Countries, *Sicily*, thatmuſt *neceſſarily* be attacked, and therefore *ſure* of being preſerved, by a *Naval* Force. So that for the Safety of *this* alone *England* can be anſwerable by her *natural*, that is her *marine*, Efforts. And perhaps this might be done without coming to a Rupture. The *Neutrality* of *one* Country has been engaged for from a Regard to *Holland*, and it's not unreaſonable to think that *that* of *another* might be procured at the Inſtances of *England*. Beſides,

are

are not the *Dutch* bleſs'd with as quick *political* Eyes, as any of their Neighbours? And if They don't ſee the Danger of *Europe*, they who will be more immediately affected by an *unequal* Diſtribution of Sovereignty on the *Continent*, we may croſs our Arms, and be very eaſy. 'Tis impoſſible for any reaſonable Miniſter to think of engaging *England* in a War with *France* and *Spain*, if the *Dutch* continue *neuter*, engroſſing to themſelves by that Means the Commerce of the whole World, enriching themſelves by their *ancient* Channels of Trade, and deriving to themſelves *new* Ones, that will then be irrecoverable to us. 'Tis impoſſible, I ſay, to apprehend this, till a thorough Infatuation ſhall have poſſeſſed our Councils, till the *Premier's* Political Lights ſhall be totally extinguiſh'd, and our Miniſters at *home* change *Heads* with the Miniſters we ſend *abroad*.

But we have all the Reaſon in the World to be aſſured, that *theſe*, and many *more* Thoughts of the *ſame* Kind, will occur to thoſe, who *preſide* in the Adminiſtration, and that *England* will furniſh one Exception to Sir *William Temple's* Obſervation, "That the Councils "of a Miniſter, after *fifty two*, are always tinc-"tured with *Old Age*." If there ſhould be any ſanguine for a War, from exalted Notions of our *own* Riches, and contemptible Ones of the *Emperor's*, they will do well to examine, whether the *clear* Imperial Revenues are not equal to the *clear* Revenues of *England*, for an Eſtate of 500 *l. per. Ann.* neat Produce, is equal to another of 1500 *l.* out of which 1000 *l.* is annually paid for *Intereſt*. But it may be replied, that

that an Union, even of two *clear* Revenues, will be inſufficient for the carrying on a War againſt *France*, and that the greateſt Part of the *Emperor*'s muſt remain *unalienated*, from the Apprehenſion, in Perſons able to lend, of a *precarious* Security. Whereas *England* is bleſs'd with the Power of anticipating to the *laſt Shilling* of her Revenues, to oblige a Prince incapacitated from doing the ſame, even in his *own* Quarrel. It will be difficult to reply to this. It ſhall be allowed as a Felicity of our *own*, to which no *other* Country has Pretenſions.

There is yet one Thing more that deſerves a little Attention, and that is, whether it would be prudent for *England*, by an unreaſonable Partiality, to unteach the *French* Fidelily to their Alliances, which we may ſome time or other have Occaſion for again. We have had no Reaſon to complain of the Inexecution of their *Treaties* with regard to *us*, ſince the Death of *Lewis* XIV. and muſt we *now* convince them, that whether they adhere to, or diſregard thoſe *Treaties*; whether they relinquiſh or retain their once favourite Views on the *Netherlands*; in a word, whether they purſue the old *Ambitious* Scheme, or only enter into a *juſt* War, we ſtill preſerve the ſame Animoſity againſt them? Or will it be ſaid, that, becauſe they once vexed *Europe* with *unjuſt* Wars, therefore, the Temper of their King, and the Complexion of their *Councils*, being altered, they can never have Grounds for a *juſt* one? That the preſent *may* be a *juſt* War on the ſide of *France*, none can diſprove, even tho' they ſhould think

think the *Emperor*'s Pretenſions better founded; for Juſtice, as an Attribute of *Perſons*, may ſubſiſt with an Injuſtice of *Things*, and a War, with Reſpect to the *Parties waging* it, be juſt on *both* ſides; to explain which I ſhall not be troubleſome with Quotations, but thoſe that pleaſe may conſult *Grotius* de Ju. Bel. & Pa. 2. 23. 3 and *Puffendorff* de Ju. Nat. & Gent. 8. 6. 4. in Not.

From *Juſtice*, if we turn aſide our Eyes to *Policy*, here indeed we muſt confeſs the Superiority of the *Imperialiſts*. That *ableſt Council Board of any Prince in Europe*, thoſe finiſhed Stateſmen, of elevated Talents, and unerring Politicks, that the Partizans of *Auſtria* have for many Years ſounded ſo high, how indulgently have they convinced Mankind, that they have nothing to fear from their Dexterity? To recall, from his Juvenile *Studies* in the Foreſt of *Fontainbleau*, to more ſerious ones on the Banks of the *Rhine*, a *Prince* hitherto indiſpoſed to War, and awaken in him the *Hereditary* Ambition of his Family; to leave deſtitude and unprovided a *Dutchy*, Frontier to *another Prince* deſcended of very *ductile* Anceſtors, who *poſſibly* might, and who *certainly has* confederated with *France*; to throw in the King *of Spain*'s Way an Opportunity of joining to Attack the *Italian* Dominions, who has impatiently watch'd for it this *twenty* Years; is ſuch a Series of *Political Inadvertencies*, as could flow from nothingbut the Condeſcention of the *Imperial* Miniſters to inform *Europe*, that *Vienna* ſtands juſt in the ſame Longitude and Latitude as ever, and that *Germans* when they have

have not *England* to impoſe upon, will be *Germans* ſtill.

With Regard to *Us* indeed the Advocates of that *Court* will never want Arguments to prove the Expediency of a Rupture, but ſuch as would paſs for *Bantering* inſtead of *Reaſoning*, if produced to others. To *England* they will ſay, " It's true our imperious Meaſures have " been attended with ſome unlucky Conſe- " quences, but to avert them, is *your* Buſi- " neſs, not *ours*. The Depreſſion of the Houſe " of *Auſtria* affects itſelf but *remortely*, you it " regards *immediately*. The Safety of *ourſelves* " may be a Point of ſome *little* Conſideration " for *Us*, but a very *important* one for *you*. We " have ſet our own Houſe on Fire indeed, but " it ought not to be *our* Care to extinguiſh it. " Be that *your* Concern, who live at the *End* " of the Street, and muſt, by its Spreading, " be involved in the Conflagration; nay, what's " more, if you will extinguiſh it your *own* " Way, and not *ours*, it ſha'n't be done at all." Much of the grave Reaſoning for aſſiſting the *Emperor* is only this, in other Words.

I imagine I am over-looking the Diſpatches of a *certain* Court to *ſomebody* here, and read there, *You will repreſent to his* Britannick Majeſty's *Miniſters, how ſenſibly we find ourſelves affected by having ſubmitted to the Alteration of Spaniſh inſtead of Neutral Gariſons in the Places* of Tuſcany, &c. *The Poſſeſſion of* Leghorn *by* Spain *is miſuſed now by that Crown, to pour her Troops upon Us into* Italy. *And will not the* Britiſh *Miniſtry think their Honour concerned to vindicate their own favourite Meaſure, condeſcended to on our Side, at* their *Inſtances*? And

I imagine I hear a rational *Engliſh* Miniſter, make this Reply: *How came the Subſtitution of Spaniſh, inſtead of Neutral, Gariſons, to be the favourite Point of* England? *Was it not rather a neceſſary than an eligible One, and who induced this Neceſſity? Was it not* You *that obliged Us to have Recourſe to that Expedient to ſatisfy* Spain, *and thereby diſſolve an Alliance of your* Own, *entered into with that Crown, to undermine our moſt valuable Intereſts? And would you now involve Us in a War, upon Allegations drawn from the Conſequences of a Meaſure, made neceſſary for Us to repair the Injury of your* own *Violation of Treaties?*

To conclude, the Advocates for War may impoſe upon us by *Appearances*, and *fallacious* Reaſoning, in *ſome* Things, but in *one* Thing they can't; and that is, that if it ſhall be found neceſſary to raiſe 20,000 *Sailors* more than at preſent, that ſingle Augmentation will conſume the whole of *two Shillings* in the Pound *more* on Land. And if weary of the Bleſſings of Peace, for many Years preſerved to us by temperate and beneficent Councils, We muſt now once more turn *Knight Errants* for the *Emperor*, it cannot be imagined, from the Precedents of *paſt* Times, that a leſs Number than 40,000 *Land-men* will be thought neceſſary to *begin* with, for the annual Pay of which a *Million* muſt be raiſed by ſome new Tax, or Anticipation, or the Produce of the *Sinking Fund* diverted for their Maintenance. And when *England* has once diveſted herſelf of the Impartiality requiſite for *mediating* Offices, and made herſelf a Party in the Quarrel, who will *then* be the Mediator, or who will be *allowed*

to

to be ſo, and when the War will end, None can tell.

Upon the Whole, for the great Point of *Peace* or *War*, we may ſafely rely upon the Deciſion of his *Majeſty*, and his Councils. Let us believe, that He'll not ſuffer Conſiderations, derived from the Acceſſibility of his *Foreign Territories* to the Princes of the *Continent*, to affect the Independency of the *Britiſh* Crown; that he will never give Reaſon to an *Engliſh* Parliament to complain, that his *German* Politicks interfere with the Intereſts of *Thoſe*, who have called him to more *ample* Dominion. We gratefully acknowledge his *paternal* Cares, for the beſt Reaſon in the World, becauſe We have always experienced them; and willingly confer on him the Title He has ſo well deſerved, of *Father of his Country*. But to cut off even the Hopes of applying collaterally from the *Imperial* Miniſters, the beſt, the loyalleſt, of his Subjects may wiſh, without any Indecency, that He was the Political *Father of fewer Children*.

FINIS.